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The Morality of Killing 
Introduction 
I am going to examine four argu­
ments designed to answer the ques­
tion: What, if anything, is wrong 
with painlessly killing domestic animals 
for food? Two are based on an appeal 
to consistency, two on utility. I will 
not discuss the position, made famous 
by Peter Singer, that rearing food 
animals is immoral when utility is not 
maximized. That argument, which, in 
Singer's words, is "based on the issue 
of suffering and not on the question 
of killing," 1 has forced many of us to 
examine our attitudes toward animals 
and led some of us to become vegeta­
rians. By leaving killing out of the 
picture, however, many instances of 
meat-eating are not obviously wrong 
on utilitarian grounds, such as eating 
meat from humanely reared animals. 
Also, future possibilities include eat­
ing meat from animals anesthetized or 
genetically engi nee red to feel Iittle or 
no pain while being reared. Such 
practices would most likely pass the 
test of util ity . Tom Rega n, an advo­
cate of rights-based, vegetarianism, 
goes even further: Hit is not obvi­
ously true that the consequences for 
everyone affected would be better, all 
considered, if intensive rearing meth­
ods were abandoned and we all (or 
most of us) became (all at once or 
gradually) vegetarians. "2 I am not 
su re about that. Nonetheless, I am 
convinced that effective utilitarian­
based and rights-based arguments 
supporting vegetarianism must show 
that there is something wrong with 
I painlessly killing animals for food; 
short of that, at best only certain 
instances of meat-eating are immoral. 3 
The fi rst argument I wi II look at is 
one version of the argument for moral 
consistency (AMC): Roughly, if you 
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believe that all humans (including 
severely retarded infants) have a 
right to life, then you must believe 
that certain animals, those which 
possess relevant capacities equal or 
superior to "marginal humans," also 
have that right. After rejecting that 
reasoning on the ground that it 
assumes too much about wh ich bei ngs 
have a rig ht to I ife, I turn to the 
second argument, recently supported 
by Singer, that there is a utilitarian 
basis for claiming that killing certain 
animals, those which are self-con­
scious (or have a desire to continu'e 
living), is wrong. In arguing that 
utilitarianism of any variety leads to 
no such conclusion, I develop a posi­
tion on killing which I believe both is 
entailed by consistent utilitarian rea­
soning and is reasonable. That posi­
tion, the th i rd argument I wi II look 
at, involves the claim that animals 
lack a right to life, as do certain 
humans, not because they lack self­
consciousness, but because (a) they 
lack the ability to be troubled by the 
thought that their lives are not cov­
ered by society's moral prohibition 
agai nst kill ing or (b) they lack (a) 
and killing them would not signifi­
cantly frustrate the interests of other 
beings. I then examine some objec­
tions to this position, the last of 
which is set off as the fourth argu­
ment. It is a version of the AMC, 
one frequently used by Singer: tllf 
we do not reject the belief that it is 
wrong to kill mentally defective 
humans for food, then we must reject 
the bel ief that it is all right to kill 
animals at the same level of mental 
development for the same purpose. " .. 
I argue that by appealing to a princi­
pile Singer himself accepts, the princi­
ple of utility, one can make. a strong 
case for retaining both the first and 
second bel iefs while avoiding cha rges 
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of inconsistency and "species ism" 
(ignori ng the interests of members of 
other species for no reason other than 
that they are members of other spec­
ies). . 
As suggested above, my primary 
aim in this paper is to show where I 
think Singer's position on killing goes 
wrong and that the change, compatible 
with his basic utilitarian outlook, he 
might consider making is adopting 
argument #3; my secondary aim is to 
show that argument #3 is promising. 
Argument #1:
 
Regan's Version of the AMC
 
Tom Regan's formulation of the 
AMC is a good place to start. Found 
throughout the literatu re on an imal 
rights, it has come to be known as 
the "argument from marginal cases": 
. . . arguments that might be 
used in defense of the claim 
that all human beings have this 
natur·al right [to life] to an 
equal extent would also show 
that animals are possessors of 
it, whereas a rguments that 
might be used to show that 
animals do not have this right 
would also show that not all 
human beings do either. 5 
Thus, according to Regan, each 
and every reasonable criterion of the 
possession of a right to life will either 
Include all humans and also some ani­
mals or exclude all animals and also 
some humans. Rega n f req uently 
argues that if we assume that humans, 
including infants and the severely 
retarded, have a right to life, then 
we must accept the implication that 
any reasonable criterion capable - of 
supporting that assumption will surely 
include some animals as well. 6 
If Regan is correct in claiming that 
there is no defensible right-grounding 
capacity (such as rationality or self­
consciousness) which all humans 
possess and which all animals lack, 
then we are left with choosing one of 
the followi ng th ree option s : (l ) 
believe that all humans and some ani­
mals have a right to life, (2) believe 
that some humans (the marginal cases) 
do not have and some animals do have 
a right to life, or (3) believe that 
some humans and all animals lack a 
right to life. Whichever option is 
chosen will demand signific?nt attitu­
dinal changes concerning killing ani­
mal-s or marginal humans. 
Nearly all philosophers agree that 
the AMC forces us to abandon the 
traditional belief that all and only 
humans have a right to life and adopt 
one of the above options. As we shall 
see, Singer defends the second option 
and I defend the third. 7 Regan 
accepts the fi rst option on the basis 
of the force of the AMC in conjunction 
with the postulate that even marginal 
humans have a right to life. How he 
defends that postulate is not important 
here. What is important 'to note is 
that a defense of option ,#1 cannot 
rest solely on the AMC, for it is inca­
pable of supplying a reason for 
rationally preferring one option over 
any of the others because each is of 
equal value from the point of view of 
consistency. Obviously, to get any­
where we need -to know what charac­
teristic(s) a being must possess in' 
order to deserve coverage-to have a 
right to life-and which beings actually 
possess that characteristic. 
Setting Up the Problem 
Which of the above options should 
we select, and why? We have already 
seen that an AMC-based defense of 
option #1 is inadequate unless supple­
mented by a defense of the assumption 
. that marginal humans have a right to 
life. In order for one of the options 
to stand out as rationally preferable, 
we need to know what it is that gives 
one being (say, X) but not another 
(Y) a right to life, that is, what 
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justifies including X but not Y within 
the scope of the moral rule against 
killing. X must have something which 
Y lacks. That could be one (or some 
combi nation) of the following cha rac­
teristics: 
(a)	 a soul 
(b)	 membership in the species Homo 
sapiens 
(c)	 sentience: the capacity to 
experience pleasure and pain 
(d) rationality and language 
(e)	 "self-consciousness" (i n Sing­
er's sense): the desire to con­
tinue living as a distinct entity 
with a past and a futu re 
(f)	 "cognizance": the ability to 
experience anxiety and fear 
upon realizing that one's life 
lacks coverage (that one's life is 
not covered by the moral prin­
ciple against killing) 
(g)	 a certain relation to others: 
that is, others have an interest 
in XIS continued existence but 
not in V's. 
Natu rally there are other proper­
ties that cou Id have been added to the 
list but none which comes to mind 
strikes me as plausible. I have 
excluded the notion of "inherent 
value" because I think that the pro­
ponents of this view, despite thei r 
differences, agree that if X has 
inherent value then X has, among 
other things, a right to life. At any 
rate, (d)-(g) are the properties most 
relevant to the next three a rgumentsl 
will be examining. 
Looking over the list, if either (a) 
or (b) is a justified criterion of hav­
ing a right to life, then the tradi­
tional view is justified: the view that 
all and only human beings have a 
right to life, which 'means, according 
to that tradition, that it is a much 
more serious matter, ~ven when side­
effects are ignored, to kill a human 
being than it is to kill an animal of 
comparable intelligence and self-a­
wareness. Arguments against (a) are 
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well-known and will not be summarized 
here; suffice it to say, even if all and 
only humans have immortal souls it is 
hard to see why killing a human is 
morally worse than killing an animal 
that does not have the benefit of an 
afterlife. As for (b), Singer and 
others have effectively argued that it 
is a speciesist criterion and· is com­
pletely indefensible. After all, what 
possible connection exists between 
havi ng twenty-th ree pai r's of ch romo­
somes and having a right to life,? 
Many consider (c) relevant to poss­
essing a right to be spared unde­
served pain but it is not at all obvi­
ous how sentience could be a 
sufficient condition of having a right 
to life. I will argue that (d) is some­
times relevant to the morality of kill­
ing because some beings capable of 
reasoning and of communicating do so 
in such a sophisticated way that· they 
possess (f), that is, the ability to 
experience fear when they "figure 
out" that thei r Iives a re not covered 
by . the prohibition against killing. 
Criterion (e), self-consciousness, is 
defended by Singer and will be dis­
cussed momentarily. For a being to 
have (f), what, for lack of a better 
term, I have called "cognizance," it 
must at least be both self-conscious, 
(e), and able to reason and communi­
cate with some soph istication, (d). In 
my defen se of option #3-that some 
humans and all domestic food animals 
lack a right to life-I will be defending 
criterion (f); this means that (d) and 
(e), being individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions of (f), will 
in effect be supported. Finally, I will 
also support criterion (9), that is, I 
will argue that we must seriously con­
sider coveri ng a bei ng by the ru Ie 
against killing even if it lacks the 
ability to be tr'oubled by not falling 
under that ru Ie so long as other 
beings have a (rational) interest in its 
continued existence. 
Argument #2: Singer's Defense of
 
Criterion (e) and Option #2
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In various places Singer considers 
the complex topic of killing. For 
brevity, let us focus on one case 
which he addresses: lfwhether it 
would be r'ight to kill and eat a pig if 
the pig lived happily under pleasant 
conditions and was killed painlessly. "8 
To answer that, Singer employs two 
unrelated str~ategies: a version of the 
AMC and utilitarianism. His use of 
the AMC is the fourth argument I will 
examine. The cOI~e of his utilitarian 
analysis is that "while species makes 
no difference to the wrongness of 
killing, the possession of certain 
capacities, in particular the capacity 
to see oneself as a distinct entity with 
a future does."9 He calls that capac­
ity "self-consciousness," calls anyone 
possessing it a "person," and 
observes that some "human beings" 
(members of the species Homo sapiens) 
are not persons while some animals 
are. This leads to the question 
whether a pig is self-conscious. 
Singer admits that this "is not an 
easy matter to settle." 1 0 However, 
since much is at stake (maybe we are 
turning persons into bacon), and 
since it is difficult to tell whether a 
pig is a person, Singer believes that 
"it would seem better to give the pig 
the benefit of the doubt. "11 
This analysis raises many questions 
. of cou rse. For ou r pu rposes, two 
stand out: What, more precisely, 
does Singer mean by "self-conscious­
ness," and, secondly, why does he 
believe that self-consciousness is rele­
vant to, and carries such great 
weight when dealing with, the wrong­
ness of killing? 
To be lfself-conscious" in Singer's 
sen se a bei ng mu st at least be awa re 
of itself as an entity, distinct from 
other entities in the world I and we 
"might add the requi rement that the 
being be aware that it exists over a 
period of time, that it has a past and 
a futu re; for to be awa re of oneself 
as an entity it may be necessa ry to be 
awa re of oneself as ex isti ng over some 
period of time, however brief. "12 
Finally, "Rationality is probably 
already included in our conception of 
self-consciousness, since a being 
would not attain self-consciousness 
without possessing at least a minimally 
rational understanding of the 
world. "13 One might call this the 
"minimal sense of self-consciousness." 
For our purposes, the key to 
Singer's account is that a self-con­
scious being has a desire or prefer­
ence to go on living. What is 
involved in having such a preference 
is a matter of some dispute. Singer 
seems to think that a being capable of 
having some preferences about its own 
futu re thereby has a preference to go 
on living. It is a preference in a 
minimal sense, better understood per­
haps by contrasti ng it with what 
might be called the "extended sense" 
found in views such as Regan's: 
To desire to continue to live 
presupposes that one have a 
conception of one's own mortal­
ity-that one can forsee or 
anticipate one's eventual dem­
ise. And it presupposes, fur­
ther, that, having considered 
what one's death involves 
together with one's anticipated 
life prospects, one desires to 
continue to live in preference 
to dying. 14 
According to Regan, then, animals 
that are minimally self-conscious, 
though having some desires relating to 
their future, lack a desire to go on 
living in the relevant (extended) 
sense because it "is extremely doubt­
ful that the moral patients at issl~e
have the intellectual wherewithal· to 
conceive of thei r own death or to 
make the kind of comparative judgment 
Singer's view requires. "15 Singer 
would no doubt agree that pigs and 
other (presumably) minimally self-con­
scious beings lack this "\ntellectua\ 
wherewithal, " yet claim that such 
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beings nonetheless have, in some 
sense, a desire to go on living. We 
can grant him that claim and still 
show that his view on killing self-con­
scious beings is inadequate. This 
takes us to ou r second question. 
Singer believes that self-conscious­
ness is a relevant consideration when 
evaluating the wrongness of killing 
because killing a being with a desire 
to continue living involves frustrating 
that desire. Of course one might 
argue that, once dead, the being will 
not experience the frustrated desi re. 
Singer's well-known reply to this 
involves distinguishing classical from 
preference utilitarianism: 
According to preference utili­
tarianism, an action contrary 
to the preference of any being 
is, unless this preference is 
outweighed by contrary pref­
erences, wrong. Killing a 
person who prefers to continue 
Iivi ng is therefore wrong, 
other things being equal. 
That the victims are not 
around after the act to lament 
th e fact that th ei r p referen ces 
have been disregarded is irrel­
,evant. 16 
The clause "other things being 
equal" invites a problem in light of 
Singer's admission that "the prefer­
ence of the victim could sometimes be 
outweighed by the preferences oth-'of · 
ers. "17 So, in the case of the happy 
pig, is it not plausible to suppose 
that the preferences of those who 
have cared for and plan to eat the pig 
outweigh the pig's preference to con­
tinue living? After all, as Regan's 
position implies, a pig, arguably lack­
ing the capacity to form a conception 
of its own mortality, does not in any 
meaningful sense prefer its future 
existence to nonexistence. But, even 
ignori ng that important poi nt, and 
granting that the interest an animal 
takes in its future' existence is rele­
vant to the question of killing, I 
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believe that Singer gives that interest 
much more weight in the decision­
making process than his utilitarian 
outlook can justify. One way of sup­
porting that claim is to turn to Sing­
er's view on "replaceability." I will 
try to show that, even on the 
assumption that pigs are minimally 
self-conscious, h is position impl ies 
they are replaceable; thus killing them 
can, contrary to what Singel~ thinks, 
be rather easily justified. (Another 
way of supporting that claim, which I 
will not pursue but which I think is 
valid, would involve showing that 
Singer implicitly gives greater weight 
to life preferences than to tastepref­
erences even when they are of equal 
intensity and that he supplies no jus­
tification for so doi ng. ) 
Let us start by looking at Singer's 
position on killing sentient beings 
lacking self-consciousness-"ch ickens 
cou Id be an exarnpie. " 1 8 
Given that an animal belongs to 
a species incapable of self-con­
sciousness, it follows that it is 
not wrong to rear and kill it 
for food, provided that it leads 
a pleasant life and, after, being 
killed, will be replaced . by 
another animal which will lead 
a similarly pleasant life and 
wou Id not have existed if the 
first animal had not been 
killed. This means that vege­
tarianism is not obligatory for 
those who can obtain meat from. 
animals that they know have 
been reared in this manner. 19 
The "replacement clause" is 
inserted to avoid the utilitarian objec­
tion that killing a happy animal 
reduces the total amount of pleasure. 
in the world. Thus, the only moral 
consideration involving killing non­
self-conscious beings is the matter of 
HII ing the pleasu re void because they 
"can properly be regarded as recepta­
cles for experiences of pleasu re and 
patn, rather than as individuals 
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leading lives of their own. "2.0 More 
fully, 
. with non -self-conscious 
life, birth and death cancel 
each other out; whereas with 
self-cons'cious beings the fact 
that once self-conscious one 
may desire to continue living 
means that death inflicts a loss 
for wh ich the bi rth of another 
is insufficient compensation. 2. 1 
The above claim is not, and can not 
be, supported by Singer. Even if 
pigs are self-conscious, and we kill 
one, the replacement pig wi II come to 
develop self-consciousness, and at 
that point will be a near perfect 
replacement for the one that was 
killed. I say "nea r perfect" because, 
according to preference utilitarianism, 
by killing the pig we frustrated its 
preference to continue living and that 
loss was not sufficiently offset by 
bringing into existence a replacement 
pig and rearing it under similar con­
ditions. That loss, however, could be 
offset by a gain elsewhere: for 
instance, by taking steps to make the 
replacement pig's life even more plea­
sant than that of the pig it replaced, 
thereby making it a "perfect replace­
ment. " I believe this shows that 
painlessly' taking the life of a pig (or 
any minimally self-conscious being) 
and filling the "void" with the bi rth 
of another can be easily justified on 
utilitarian grounds and that Singer is 
mistaken in believing otherwise. 
To summa rize, for the simple rea­
son cited above, Singer fails to justify 
the belief that pigs, but not chickens, 
are non - replaceable, that kill i ng the 
former is, whereas killing the latter is 
not, a morally serious matter. In 
neither case (if the killing is done 
. discreetly) are there measu reable side 
effects in the form of grief or anxiety 
felt by other beings like chickens, 
pigs, birds, microorganisms, or 
humans. True, if Singer is correct 
about which beings are self-conscious, 
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then in the case of killing pigs, as 
opposed to chickens, one frustrated 
preference is not quite offset by the 
birth of another, but that, we have 
seen, is a problem easily remedied. 
In short, the mere possession of 
self-consciousness is not the capacity 
to wh ich a uti lita rian (act or ru Ie, 
hedonistic or non-hedonistic) should 
appeal in drawing a line between those 
beings who are seriously covered by 
the moral rule against killing and 
those who are not, those beings who 
have a strong presumptive right to 
I ife and those who do not. 
By unfolding the position I think 
Singer should accept and which I am 
inclined to accept, the difficulties Ic 
have with Singer's position become 
more appa rent. 
Argument #3: A Defense of Option #3 
and Criteria (f) and (g) 
believe that killing certain self­
conscious beings raises .no moral 
problems within a utilitarian framework 
such as Singer's. Which: self-con­
scious beings? Those which· lack both 
(f) and (g). Why (f) is important is 
obvious: Any being with the capacity 
to experience anxiety and fear upon 
knowi ng that its life lacks coverage 
(is viewed as lacking inherent value), 
would most likely lead a worse life 
than if it knew it had coverage; for 
that reason, utility would no doubt be 
maximized by including such a being 
within the scope of the moral rule 
against killing, by viewing its life as 
specia I and non - replaceable. 2. 2. If a 
bei ng lac ks (f) , it does not follow 
that ki IIi ng it raises no mora I prob­
lems. Even if the killing is painless 
and out of range of other beings 
capable of feeling anxiety were they 
to witness it, nonetheless, mates, off­
spring, companions, or humans might 
have an interest in that being's con­
tinued existence and thereby suffer as 
a result of its loss. If, after all the 
consequences are cou nted and 
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weighed, the killing failed to bring 
about the best agg regate resu It, then 
it would be wrong. Thus, possessing 
(g) should, given utilitarian theory, 
enable that being to be covered by 
society's prohibition against killing, 
even though it lacks (f). 
In short, if a bei ng has what for 
convenience I have been calling a 
"right to life," that right, on my 
account, can be grounded either on 
the interest that being has in avoiding 
the anxiety that would occur should it 
know that its Iife lacks coverage (a 
self-based right to life) or on the 
interest other beings have in avoiding 
the anxiety and grief that would occur 
should that being's life lack coverage 
(other-based right to life). Either 
way, having a right to life (deserving 
coverage) is based on considerations 
of uti Iity; either way, the life in 
question should be regarded as non­
replaceable (as having inherent 
value) . 
Does a pig have either (f) or (g)? 
It is hard to make a case for its 
possessing (f), cognizance, even 
though one might grant that it is 
self-conscious in Si nger' s sense. 
Su rely a pig is not capable of being 
troubled by the knowledge that it is a 
replacement for a pig which has been 
killed, so the replacement will "con­
tai n" about the same amou nt of pleas­
ure as the pig it is replacing (for it 
wi II experience no dissatisfaction from 
living with the thought that it is a 
replacement, that someday it will be 
killed for food). But some self-con­
scious beings have the additional 
capacity;. (f), to be troubled by living 
in a world in which they lack cover­
age and are perceived as expendable 
or replaceable. This fact leads me to 
"draw the line" between cases of kill­
ing which are serious and cases which 
are not in a place different than does 
Singer; and it strikes me that the 
place I have drawn it is about where 
a utilitarian (of any variety) should 
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draw it.
 
On my account, marginal humans
 
lack a self-based right to life. 
(Singer would agree, not on the 
g rou nd, though, that they lack (f), 
cognizance, but that they are thought 
to lack (e), self-consciousness.) This 
does not mean that any instance of 
killing marginal humans is morally jus­
tified. Of course not. There are 
additional considerations: others 
might have a strong interest in the 
conti n ued existence of the bei ngs in 
question. This takes us to (g), the 
side effects argument. 
It is quite possible for something 
lacking (f)-such as a severely 
retarded human, a pig, a sentient 
bei ng, a plant, or a rock formation-to 
have an other-based right to· contin­
ued existence, since it is possible for 
beings to have an interest in such 
things. The same point, limited to 
pigs, can be expressed without refer­
ring to "rights": If suddenly a num­
ber of beings were sufficiently dis­
tu rbed by the fact that pigs were 
being painlessly killed and eaten, to 
the point where that practice failed to 
achieve the optimal balance of satis­
faction over frustration of prefer­
ences, then a prohibition against kill­
ing and eating pigs, even happy pigs, 
would be morally justified. However,. 
this is not presently the case. True, 
as nonconsequentialists are quick to 
poi nt out, it cou Id be the case some­
day. If so, killing and eating pigs 
would be wrong on utilitarian 
grounds-unless, of course, one both 
accepts a version of utilitarianism in 
which frustrated "irrational desires 
and aversions" (however defined) are 
given less weight or totally discounted 
in utility assessments and determines 
that most aversions to killing pigs 
painlessly are irrational. More on 
that later. 
To summarize, I bel ieve that there 
is a sig nificant difference between 
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killing a being possessing (f) and 
killing a pig. What counts is not so 
much the capacity, emphasized by 
Singer, to desire continued life, as 
the capacity to recognize that one and 
those one cares about are not covered 
by society's moral prohibition against 
killing. That latter capacity presup­
poses rather extensive commu n ication 
and reasoning skills because in order 
to experience the anticipatory dread 
of death a being must have a concep­
tion of its own mortality and be able 
to come to know that its Iife or~ that 
of another being in whom it has an 
interest is endangered. What is cru­
cial to distinguishing cases of killing 
which raise serious moral problems 
within a utilitarian perspectiv~ from 
those which do not is distinguishing 
those beings who are capable of "los­
ing sleep" over the realization that 
thei r Iives lack coverage from those 
who are not. Painlessly killing a 
nameless pig out of sight of others 
does not, presumably, cause other 
beings much grief or anxiety. The 
most that happens is that, if it were a 
contented pig, a certain amount of 
pleasu re is lost from the world. So, 
if one is upset by this loss or one's 
normative theory demands that one be 
troubled by this loss, then one can 
replace the dead pig with the bi rth of 
another pig or, and this should be 
acceptable to Singer, create that 
. amount of pleasure (assuming of 
cou rse that it can be roughly gauged) 
in some other manner. 
I will now consider two rather sim­
ilar objections to argument #3. One 
strategy consists of pointing out some 
counterintuitive implications of adopt­
ing criteria (f) and (g). The second 
involves an appeal to moral consis­
tency, namely, if you bel ieve that it 
is wrong to kill marginal humans for 
food (or for similar, trivial reasons), 
then you should also believe that it is 
wrong to kill animals at the same level 
of mental development for food. This 
second objection is set off as 
argument #4. 
One might object to the view that 
cognizance is a sufficient condition of 
having a right to life by showing that 
it has some rather unsavory implica­
tions. Among those beings clearly 
excluded by th is criterion, besides 
animals and severely retarded infants, 
are (a) normal infants, perhaps up to 
three years of age, and (b) the hope­
less Iy sen iIe. Now, it is true that 
criterion (f) sets a very high cutoff 
point for moral considerability (with 
respect to killing), even higher than 
those set by Warren and Tooley in the 
abortion debate. I do not think this 
is a serious problem, however, 
because these purported counter-ex­
amples can be dismissed by appealing 
to what I take to be another sufficient 
condition of moral standing, (g). 
Turning first to objection la, let 
us consider the case of a healthy one 
year old infant, lacking (f) , whose 
pa rents no longer ca re for if and want 
it ki lied. To deal with such a case, I 
would bring criterion (g) into 
play-that is, I would appeal to the 
side effects-and argue that the prac­
tice of killing unwanted, non-cogni­
zant children would have less net 
utility than some alternative practice, 
such as putting them up for adoption. 
If one is in a situation in which find­
ing surrogate parents is impossible, 
then I would, relying on (g) again, 
try to show that actions of this type 
would so frustrate the interests others 
have in children that utility would not 
be maximized. Though rare cases can 
be imagined in which particular acts 
of killing healthy infants (or adults) 
would bring about marginal increases 
in utility, the general practice of 
placing them outside the scope of the 
moral rule against killing would not 
produce as much net utility as cover­
ing them by that rule. 
Objection 1b-that there is, on my 
account, nothing wrong with killing. 
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sen i Ie individuals lacking cogni­
zance-alsomisses the mark. First of 
all, the fact that such individuals 
were cognizant throughout most of 
their lives means that, if they grew 
up in a society with a rule against 
killing wh ichdid not cover the senile, 
then it seems reasonable to suppose 
that as a g roup they wou Id experience 
considerable stress when thinking 
about what might happen to them and 
those they care about. Presumably, 
th is wou Id not be offset by th e 
advantages of a moral principle sanc­
tioning killing in such cases. Sec­
ondly, lacking coverage would frus­
trate the preferences of those who 
prefer to see the s'enile cared for 
rather than killed. Though not as 
st ro ngas the caseaga instinfan tic ide, 
these probable consequences add up 
to a fai rly strong case agai nst placi ng 
the senile outside the scope of the 
rule which prohibits killing. 
Obviously, many issues need to be 
addressed in this connection, includ­
ing the proper role of rules in utilita­
rian reasoning, but I hope enough has 
been said to indicate how I would go 
about defending argument #3 against 
objections like la and lb. It is worth 
noting that Singer's position, argu­
ment #2, is vulnerable to similar 
objections, thus Singer would take on 
no new problems if, as I th ink he 
should, he were to adopt argument 
#3. 
Naturally, because group prefer­
ences can change over time, there are 
some dangers in resting cases for and 
against killing on criterion (g). For 
instance, we could someday come to 
feel no disapproval when reflecting on 
the killing of healthy human infants, 
in which case any (g) -based argument 
would be undermined; or, as men­
tioned earlier, we could come to have 
such a strong interest in pigs and 
other animals that killing them-even 
painlessly, after having lived a plea­
sant life-would b~ morally wrong, in 
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which case argument #3 would be 
invalid. To this a utilitarian (besides 
biting the bullet) can only say that, 
should such preferences occur, they 
ought to be discounted because they 
are irrational and that what counts 
are those preferences one would have 
under certain, rather ideal conditions. 
This raises the problem of the nature 
of irrational preferences and thei r t"ole 
in utilitarian decision-making, a prob­
lem which would have to be fully 
addressed if I were trying to provide 
a complete defense against objections 
like' 1a and 1b. My concern, how­
ever, is more modest: to show that 
argument #3 is promising. Thus, I 
will only briefly address this prob­
lem-and, since it also arises when 
considering the second objection, to 
avoid repetition, I wi II ta ke it up at 
that juncture. Because the reasoning 
utilized in that objection is rather 
popular and somewhat attractive, I 
have isolated it as argument #4. 
Argument #4:
 
Singer1s Version of the AMC
 
Singer frequently confronts us with 
a dilemma similar to this: "If we do 
not reject the bel ief that it is wrong 
to kill mentally defective humans for 
food, then we must reject the belief 
that it is all right to kill animals at 
the same level of mental development 
for the same purpose. "23 Let us put 
this reasoning in the form of an 
objection to the position on killing 
animals I am defending: If, as you 
believe, there are conditions under 
which it is morally acceptable to kill 
animals for food, then you must 
believe that it is all right to kill 
humans at the same level of mental 
development for food, but since you 
surely would not want to hold that' 
belief, consistency demands that you 
abandon the other belief. This line of 
reasoning repeatedly occurs in the Iit­
er'atu re on animal rights. The point 
is always that we do things to animals 
that we would not think of doing to 
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even horriblyi l  and permanentlytl  defec­
tive human beings (such as rear, kill, 
and eat them), the bottom line being: 
"we are guiltyi  of a gross form of 
prejudice ("speciesism"):i "  we are 
grosslyl  inconsistent from the mor'all 
poii nt of view." 2 4 Is it the case that 
one of the beliefsl  in Singer's dilemma 
must be rejected? If so, nearlyrl  
everyone will reject the beliefl  that it 
is allll right to kill animals for food. 
Yet argument #3 supports that belief.l  
Clearly,l  somethingt i  must give-and it is 
Singer's AMC. 
Let us begin by noting that the 
reasoningi  I have been using is not 
"speciesist"i t  if by that we mean either 
ignoring the interestst  of members of 
other species simplyi l  because they are 
members of other species or devising 
a right to Iife criterion with the intent 
of including allll and onlyl  members of 
ou rspecies. ·1 have made neither of 
these moves. My reasoningi  could, 
though, be speciesisti i  in this sense: 
Morally,l  I am willingi  to accept killingli  
and eatingti  of animals but not of 
humans at the same levell of mentall 
developmentl  and the on Iy justificationi  
I can give for this is that marginall 
humans are members of the species 
Homo sapiens. However, that is not 
the justificationi  I would give. I have 
already argued that within a utilita­t
rian framework there is a relevant 
difference between severelyr l  reta r'ded 
humans and animals which often justi­
fies treating the former in ways that 
would be wrong to treat the latter; 
the differencefer  is not what species 
each belongs to but the radicallyi ll  dif­i
ferent side effects that would resultl  
from similari  treatment. Basically,i ll  a 
number of humans would be very 
upset if the two groups received simi­i
lar" treatment. For this reason, even 
counting like interestst  of allll beings 
equally,ll  painlesslyl  killingli  and eatingti  
marginall humans probablyl  would not 
ng about best agg regate bal­lbri 9 the 
ance of good over evili  allll considered, 
whereas, in the case of pigs, it very 
welll  could. "Becausee  of his version 
of utilitarianism,"it i  Regan often 
stresses, "Singer must insist on the 
relevance of side effects. "25 It is 
puzzlingl  that Singer routinelyl  ignores 
this relevant differencefer  between mar­
ginall humans and animals, as in his. 
use of the AMC. 2G 
Perhaps Singer can show that this 
differencefer  is not "relevant." Passages 
like this apparentlyr tl  attempt to do so: 
"If we make a distinction between ani­i
mals and these [marginal]l  humans, 
how can we do it, other" than on the 
basis of a morally indefensible prefer­
ence for members of ou r own spec­
ies?"27 However, since Singer is 
committed to determiningt r i  what· is mor­
allyl  indefensiblei  in terms of utilityi  
and is committed to determiningt r i  utilityi  
on the basis of satisfiedti f  and frus­
pt"eferences, a itselfltrated r r preference 
cannot be morallyll  indefensible.i  So it 
appears that his objection to the rea­
soningi  I have used againsti  his AMC 
and in support of argument #3 must, 
to avoid circularity, be reworded 
(perhaps along these lines):i  Utility 
assessments-ins nt -i  this case, of killingli  
and eatingti  animals and marginall 
humans respectively-shouldcti l  not 
include the satisfactionti f  and frustration 
of preferences for members of one's 
own species because such preferences 
are arbitraryi  and irrational;l  in other 
words, one shouldl  not appeall to the 
speciesisti i  preferences of certain 
humans ina pu rportedlyl  nonspeciesisti  
effortf  to show that killingli  and eatingti  
animals is morallyll  permissiblei  but that 
killingli  and eatingti  members of the 
species Homo sapiens is not-yet that 
is exactlytl  what you have done. 
This objection to argument #3 winiU 
not do, nor will it salvagel  Singer's 
AMC. Singer (should he reason in 
the above manner) would be assumingi  
both that there is somethingt i  irra­
tional, speciesist,i i  or inconsistent 
about a person who is not distressed 
by the practice of killingli  and eatingti  
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animals but who would be seriously 
upset were we to do those things to 
marginal humans and that irrational 
sympathies and preferences ought to 
be excluded from utility assessments; 
yet he offers no theory of rational 
preferences, no theory of excl usion. 
Hence, his position will not allow him 
to discount those human preferences 
wh ich, for whatever reason, follow 
species lines. (Analogical reasoning 
based on intuitions he hopes the 
reader has regarding the wrongness 
of sexism and racism does not supply 
him. with a basis for discounting cer­
tain preferences because he explicitly 
disallows appeals to intuitions for the 
purpose of establishing normative 
claims. ) 
Enough has been said to show that 
the second objection to argument 
#3-Singer's AMC-is not adequately 
supported. Of cou rse this does not 
mean that it cannot be adequately 
supported. Naturally, we could ask: 
What jf Singer or someone else were 
successfu Ily to defend the view that 
certain preferences are irrational and 
therefore ought to be discounted from 
utility calculations? Whatever view 
might emerge, I seriously doubt that 
the preferences in question would 
turn out to be irrational, in which 
case, the side effects of killing ani­
mals or marginal humans for food 
would not change much. For obvious 
reasons a full defense of that claim 
cannot be offered here, nor is it 
really necessary. That claim is not 
relevant to my points that there is 
(without deviating from preference 
utilitarianism) a defensible escape from 
the dilemma posed in Singer's AMC 
and that Singer's preference utilita­
rian position leads to argument #3, 
not argument #2; however, it is rele­
vant to my secondary point that argu­
ment #3 is promising (in particular, to 
my earlier assertion that (g)-based 
reasoning can successfully deal with 
objections la and 1b-the infanticide 
and "senilicide" reductions). A few 
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comments, then, are in ot'der.l  
Consider, for a moment, what
 
take to be one of the best theories of
 
rational preferences, that defended in
 
various places by Richard Brandt,
 
most recently and thoroughly in A
 
Theory of the Good and the Right.
 
According to his view, a. desire or 
aversion (in this case, having a much 
stronger aversion to killing marginal 
humans for food than to killing ani­
mals for food) is irrational if and on Iy 
if it would be extinguished or its 
intensity diminished by submitting it. 
to a process similar to cognitive psy­
chotherapy (roughly, vividly and 
repeatedly reflecting upon all the rel­
evant, available information while in a 
normal frame of mind and committing 
no errors of logic). I doubt that this 
process would lead to altered pr'efer­
ence strengths to the point where a 
person would be equally upset by the 
killing of animals and marginal humans 
for food. This seems true because 
the aversion nearly all of us have to 
killing marginal humans for food· is 
probably based on· an innate process, 
perhaps the process of "sentiment­
generalization, which impels us to 
extend our sympathies on the basis of 
superficial similarities, perh·aps even 
on the basis of species. "28 
The side effects of killing and eating 
marginals would be worse than killing 
and eating animals due to this sympa­
thetic response. (I am not suggesting 
that all "natural" preferences should 
count, rather, all "rational" prefer­
ences should cou nt. ) Now, if such 
sympathies would survive cognitive 
psychotherapy in Brandt's sense 
(which, partially because of their ori­
gin, is highly probable), they could 
not be considered either irrational or 
speciesist, and thus could not be dis­
counted while deliberating about what 
is morally right; the same holds if 
one's interest in painlessly killing and 
eating animals would survive cognitive 
psychotherapy. Should this happen, 
these preferences would not be 
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irrational because they passed the test 
of rationality; they would not be arbi­
trarily speciesist because, though 
conforming to species lines, they 
would be rationally justified. (I 
would apply reasoning similar to that 
used above to fu rther support my 
position, sketched earlier, that argu­
ment #3 is not in any realistic sense 
vulnet'able to the cha rge that, shou Id 
peoples' felt preferences radically 
change, it could justify the practice 
of killing healthy infants and senile 
adults.) 
Whatever problems that theory of 
rational preferences might have, my 
point remains: Since Singer both fails 
to show that it is irrational to be more 
offended by the practice of killing and 
eating marginal humans than by the 
practice of killing and eating animals 
and fails to provide a justification for 
excluding irrational preferences from 
utility appraisals, his AMC (argument 
#4) is neither a good argument in its 
own right nor a good objection to 
argument #3; this means that there is 
a defensible escape from Singer's 
dilemma which is consistent with his 
own utilitarian approach to decision-
making. I think that approach can 
successfully undercut the many 
appeals to consistency found through­
out the literature which are similar to 
Singer's 
[certain] 
isfied by 
them for 
more or 
so with 
designed 
between 
for food 
believi ng 
AMC-for instance, "If 
conditions . . . can be sat­
morons, stocking and using 
food or experimentation is no 
less reprehensible than doing 
animals" 29-and which are 
to force us to choose 
believing that killing morons 
is morally permissible and 
that killing an imals for food 
is morally wrong. 
Conclusion 
I have tried to show that utilitari­
an-based arguments against eating 
meat, those which rest on the fact 
that enormous suffering occurs during 
rearing, gain little or no support by 
bringing killing into the picture and 
that appeals to moral consistency do 
nothing to support the claim that kill­
ing animals is morally unjustified. 
Thus, if one is to show that pain­
lessly killing animals for: food is 
wrong, some other strategy of rational 
persuasion is needed. 30 
Thomas Young
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